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Experience and the Possibility of
Metaphysical Truth

Lawrence P. Ulrich
To explore the meaning of experience demands an enquiry into the relationship
which consciousness has to the world in which it finds itself. Thus, experience
is nothing more than the bi-polar or dialectical relationship which maintains between consciousness and the world whereby consciousness, as a natural phenomenon, emerges in the world and in turn constructs the world in certain ways in
order to operate compatibly with it. To view experience in this way demands that
we do not understand experience as a kind of bridge to bring together two opposing forces or realities, namely, that of the world on one hand and that of mind on
the other. The great mistake which has often been made and which is still being
made today in some quarters is to suppose that the world stands as something
radically independent of consciousness or that consciousness is radically independent of the world. This view results, then, in the arbitrary positing of something
called experience in order to bring the two factions together and the elaborate
mechanical descriptions of the knowing process to establish this contact which
periodically emerge in the history of Western philosophy.
Instead of viewing consciousness as a spiritual alien in a world of extension
consciousness must be viewed as a natural-born son of the world with a proper
birthright. Consciousness is a natural product of the interaction of biological forces
which predate reflective activity. This is initially the reason for the intimate relationship which maintains between consciousness and the world. Experience
only enhances qualitatively this initial relationship. I do not mean to downplay
the role of experience because it does add a highly significant dimension to the
development of life. I only mean to point out that this significant dimension which
experience adds is not due to its role as the uniter of a knower and that which is
known, but rather its function is exercised in virtue of the fact that what is eventually called, in the process of development, the "knower" and the "known" are
actually united in the first place. What experience does is give a more active role
to the being which is conscious and allows this being to operate more skillfully
than its prereflective counterparts.
Initially life transcends itself by becoming conscious or reflective in virtue of
its active determination of its environment. This transcendence is not unique to
consciousness but is the characteristic activity of life. The transcendence which
consciousness undergoes through experience is a continuance of this impulse of
life to advance from one historical situation to another. What is unique about
consciousness is the fact that it can determine to some degree through experience
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the direction and scope of its transcendence. Because of this historical tendency
to transcendence , consciousness does not close in upon itself through experience
but is in a process of continual growth which we can best describe as organic;
organic in the sense that various elements are interacting with a common result.
One final observation about this transcendence which consciousness exercises:
this is not an attempt on the part of consciousness to deny or disregard the world
once it has interacted with it. To do this would be to devalue experience to the
point where it would be an inconsequential (even though somewhat important)
stepping stone to truth. We cannot disregard the centrality of experience, nor
can we take it t08 lightly, because it is the only avenue which allows for the
dialectical interaction of consciousness and the world.
We have, then, two factors which we must consider : consciousness and world .
By "world" we could mean that complexus of physical, chemical, and biological
forces (commonly called "Nature") out of which emerges reflective activity. This
description could apply if we were speaking of consciousness in a generic way.
If we were to speak of consciousness on an individual level, that is, as an individual conscious being, we might also include in the notion of "world" not only the
notion of " Nature" but also the notion of " other selves" in the sense that they
confront the individual self insofar as they stand over and against the individual
self. In either case a common factor emerges. By "the world" is meant that which
consciousness differentiates from self as other than self. When I use the phrase
"consciousness differentiates" I am reiterating what I have already said when I
observed that consciousness and world have a natural affinity for each other because consciousness emerges from the world. Consciousness adds a new dimension to this relationship through reflective experience whereby it and it alone
assumes the activity and responsibility for differentiating itself from the world.
These three considerations, (1) the dialectical interaction of consciousness and
world, (2) historical transcendence of consciousness, and (3) the centrality of experience, all have profound effects upon the philosophical enterprise which we
have traditionally labeled "metaphysics" and the fruit which this enterprise is
supposed to bear-metaphysical truth .
Metaphysical truth has ordinarily meant timeless or unchanging truth. If metaphysicians have not laid claim to the actuality of achieving metaphysical truth,
they have at least reserved to themselves the claim that there is such a reality as
metaphysical truth even though we may be historically limited in enunciating it.
The metaphysical enterprise seems to me to be on e which has historicall y emerged
as a result of man's desire to speak truthfully about the world in some ultimate
wa y. While this is a valid and certainly worthwhile occupation (if for no other
reason than that it provides food for the children of metaphysicians) I believe that
there are two considerations which doom this enterpris e to becoming the battleground for controversy and an area of unverifiable claims. The first consid eration
has to do with the extension of the term "world." This term is extended by many
metaphysicians to include not only th e material world in whi ch cons ciousness resides but also those logical entiti es of classifi cation, whi ch w e call universals, to
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which they give ontological significance which they call essences. I am not saying
that it is fruitless to deal with the problem of commonality when confronted with
diversity, I am only saying that metaphysicians have erred by giving an ontological
status to this commonality which is equal to if not superior to the diversity which
we confront in our experience. The second consideration which no longer continues
to serve metaphysics is the assumption that the world which consciousness confronts is radically independent of consciousness and is untouched by its confrontation with consciousness. This presupposes that consciousness adds nothing to
the world and that truth is a quality of the world, or of a reality independent of
consciousness, rather than truth being a quality of consciousness itself. Thus,
truth is achieved when there is an adequation of the mind to thing (with the accent
on the thing) and metaphysical truth occurs when there is an adequation of mind
to the ultimate thing.
The above position fails to take into account the fact that consciousness emerges
in the world in much the same way that every other phenomenon which we encounter emerges. Of course this could not be taken into account until fairly
recently because it was not known until fairly recently. But given its factuality
now we must no longer avoid taking it into account. Prior to the emergence of
consciousness in the world, it would seem to be impossible to talk about truth
in any way whatsoever. Truth has meaning only in the context of consciousness.
Consciousness alone is radically responsible for truth. In the dialectric relationship between consciousness and the world we might say that the world is the
content of truth and consciousness is the form of truth. Truth is really the
way in which consciousness tells itself what it experiences. Note here that
truth, then, is based upon the construction which consciousness gives to experience. We may put it in a different way:
. truth is the quality or value of the reality of man as the selfhood
of consciousness emerges by self-differentiation from the world, that
is, as the self constitutes itself as a self by its objectification of the
reality of the world.!
We see then that truth has to do with the selfhood of consciousness insofar as
it constitutes the self in virtue of the self's objectification of the world. Notice
that truth does not have to do with consciousness in isolation for it constitutes
selfhood through its objectification of the world. Nor does truth have to do with
the world independent of consciousness for any truthful judgments which we can
make about the world are made only in virtue of the world's objectification by
consciousness. It would be well at this point to recall the definition of experience
which I used at the beginning of this essay:
Experience is nothing more than the bi-polar or dialectical relationship
which maintains between consciousness and the world whereby consciousness, as a natural phenomenon, emerges in the world and in
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turn constructs the world in certain ways in order to operate compatibly
with it.
Thus, while truth requires both elements of the relationship, it is radically tied
up with consciousness and we might say that it is the language of self-reflective
consciousness.
However, there is more involved in understanding truth than conceiving of
consciousness as telling what it experiences. This process whereby consciousness
objectifies the world in experience results in more than an epistemological
alteration of consciousness. It results in ever new ontological dimensions of
selfhood. Consciousness, far from being essentially constituted by its initial
thrust, through emergence, into the world, continually redefines and reconstitutes
itself through the experiential process. It not only constitutes the reality of the
world through the process of objectification, but it also constitutes itself in
virtue of its radical historicity. In summary, consciousness does not fully exist
and express itself truthfully. Rather, in the truthful expression of self and world,
consciousness creates new ontological dimensions to self.
Thus far we have been talking of truth in general. What now of metaphysical
truth? Earlier we saw that metaphysical truth laid claim to an absolute or universal character. Such a universal character could hardly be derived from experience since experience (by any definition) is radically historical. If it is
the case that experience is central to the interaction of consciousness and world
in the way which I have described, then it would follow that we must abandon
once and for all the absolute character of metaphysical truth. The need for
this action arises from the awareness, however painful it might be, that consciousness is grounded in an ever varying dialectical relationship with the world.
Such a historical situation can never be transcended absolutely but can be
transcended only in the way in which I spoke earlier when I said that
The transcendence which consciousness undergoes through experience
is a continuation of this impulse of life to advance from one historical
situation to another.
There is a further reason for abandoning this claim for metaphysical truth.
Metaphysics has attempted to speak about reality in general and in the most
ultimate way possible. But to speak about reality in general means that one
must take into account the presence of consciousness because I cannot talk
about reality in general without taking into account all of the factors of reality.
So I must speak about reality historically since at least one of the most essential parts of reality, namely, the speaking part, is historical.
To abandon the absolute character of metaphysical truth does not necessarily
introduce into the human condition a note of reckless arbitrariness. This abandonment does take into account the notion of risk which is one of the overriding categories in any historically developmental process. Significant advances
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in development carry with them the possibility of success and the correlative
risk of failure. This could be translated in the present context into the statement: "Anytime that consciousness tells itself what it experiences it allows for
the possibility of truth and the correlative risk of error." Consciousness makes
the utmost effort to achieve truth but it does this only in terms of what may be
called " contextual compatibility." I am not certain exactly what all this term
means but it certainly would entail the awareness which consciousness has of
its historical situation, the demands which consciousness perceives in that
situation, and the purpose for the objectification which consciousness makes.
If metaphysics must abandon its claim to the absolute character of truth, then
perhaps we must abandon the notion of metaphysical truth altogether. I think
that this is not necessarily the case. However, I am tempted to say that perhaps
we should retire the terms "metaphysics" and "truth" and work out new terms
to replace them. This temptation looms large because the terms really have too
many cultural overtones to overcome in order to be very useful any longer.
Nevertheless we have them and if we redefine what is meant by them we should
be able to overcome their contextual inadequacies.
Keeping the phrase "metaphysical truth," then, my contention is that it can
be meaningful if understood in the present context of experience. Earlier I said
that the metaphysical enterprise seems to be "one" which has historically emerged
as a result of men's desire to speak truthfully about the world in some ultimate
way." Perhaps we can distill from this description the expression "the desire to
speak truthfully in some ultimate way." We would first have to determine what
we would speak about and then what the ultimate concern would be. I would
hope that by now it is apparent that "what we would speak about" is the dialectrical interaction between consciousness and the world which occurs in such
a way that when we "speak truthfully" we are dealing with a quality of consciousness rather than with a reality isolated from consciousness. Having determined our object and our initial attitude toward that object we can now say
that our ultimate concern in this enterprise is the historically ontological selfconstitution of consciousness based upon experience.
It is difficult to draw this essay to a conclusion for how can one make any
conclusive statement about experience and the possibility of metaphysical truth.
But allow me to draw it together in this way. Yes , metaphysical truth is a real
possibility if properly understood. We are dealing with metaphysical truth whenever we are speaking truthfully in such a way that we are enhancing the historicity of our consciousness. Metaphysical truth, then, has to do with the selfconstitution of consciousness as it objectifies the world in experience and as
it moves from one historical situation to another in such a way that it achieves
contextual adequacy in the dialectical relationship between consciousness and
world which we call experience.
University of Dayton
1 Leslie

Dewart, The Foundations of Belief, p. 324.
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